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If the dynamics of the downfall are clear, this article's aim is to untangle the reasons for it to happen. Back in the early 1990s, following the transformational recessions in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), a heated academic debate erupted between the proponents of shock therapy (Balcerowicz 1994; Sachs 1994 ) and gradualism (Murrell 1995; Przeworski 1991; Stiglitz 1999) . i The main assumption supporting the superiority of a gradual approach is that it produces winners in the short term who gain a stake in the reform process, whose momentum they sustain and whose achievements they defend.
However, such argument can be turned on its head. Hellman (1998, pp. 204-5) , among others, warns that gradualism may have negative long-term consequences as "short-term winners [may] stall the economy in a partial reform equilibrium that generates concentrated rents for themselves, while imposing high costs on the rest of society".
In line with such reasoning, this article contends that Slovenian gradualism, praised by several authors as the reason for the country's success (Mencinger 2004; Bohle and Greskovits 2012) , turned to be a double-edged sword that in the long-term triggered its collapse. The gradual transition of the early 1990s not only generated economic growth but also preserved social peace and maintained social equality in the face of transition. However, in the long run it resulted in the dilution of much-needed reforms. An inefficient privatisation programme -Slovenia's original sin -advantaged a managing elite, the tajkuni (tycoons), i.e. the 'short-term' winners, thereby locking the country in a partial reform equilibrium consisting of distorted management and lending practices. In the name of defending national interests, the privatization of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and of state-owned banks (SOBs) had slowed down, effectively cutting out foreign investors, concentrating the Slovenian economy in the hands of a few politically-connected (and controlled) managers and bankers (Damijan 2007) .
If protracted gradualism set the stage, two shorter-term occurrences contributed to the unexpected downfall. First, the flood of cheap credit that inundated the Slovenian financial system since the accession to the EU became an opportunity not to be missed for managers to consolidate their ownership stakes through MBOs. Given the political interference with and the corporate governance problems of domestic, mainly state-owned banks, credit misallocation to financial holdings and the construction sector was pervasive (OECD 2013, pp. 48-50) . Ineffective regulatory, judicial and banking supervision failed to nip in the bud the mounting indebtedness of the Slovenian corporate sector, which culminated in a twin banking and sovereign debt crisis.
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Second, policy paralysis became a steady feature of a polarised political system, where neocorporatism exhausted its élan. Since the Yugoslav breakup, consensual decision-making and broad coalition building were the country's modus operandi. During the 1990s, the left-liberal and rightconservative blocs saw their ideological differences compressed by the common goal of EU accession.
This changed when Janez Janša of the Slovenian Democratic Party (SDS) won the 2004 elections. The centre-right coalition felt great resentment towards the leftist Liberal Democracy of Slovenia (LDS), which dominated Slovenia politically, culturally and economically for the previous 12 years. Since then, electoral competition became toxic, the relationship with the social partners deteriorated and public protests multiplied. Growing antagonism halted the reform attempts of both Borut Pahor's Social Democrats (SD) in 2011 and Janša's second government in 2013. By then, the country was pushed into an economic and political bad equilibrium (Stanovnik, 2013) , skipped four years of restructuring and fiscal consolidation, without addressing its banking mess.
Finally, the reason why a healthier recovery did not appear is the long-term weaknesses of the Slovenian economy, a byproduct of the partial reform equilibrium. Years before the crisis began, the growth of labour productivity and technological intensity of the country's enterprises slowed down. The availability of cheap credit triggered the collapse. Corporate indebtedness grew exponentially and when the crisis hit Slovenian firms too entered a bad equilibrium. Partly as a consequence of the MBOs, little was invested into the upgrading of skills and technology, resulting in labour costs growing out of line with productivity. Moreover, the debt overhang represents a huge drag on growth. Both problems require immediate and resolute policy responses, as Slovenian firms are recovering slower than their major trading partners.
The article is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the most salient features of Slovenia's successes as an independent nation up until the Great Recession. Section 3 decomposes the main factors lying behind the collapse. Section 4 concludes by analysing the future prospects for the tiny republic.
The components of a success story
All socioeconomic indicators point into one direction: Slovenia was the most successful amid the post-socialist countries. According to Eurostat, Slovenian GDP grew on average by 4.5 per cent p. Slovenia's achievements were supported by a combination of factors rarely present in the rest of CEE: gradualism underpinned by a consensual political system, developed neocorporatist institutions and the partly inherited technologically-intensive industrial production. These are separately analysed in the following paragraphs.
Gradualism and consensual politics
Gradualism ii has highly benefitted Slovenia during its transition to a market economy. The costs in terms of unemployment and social risks were distributed over time; harmed groups were compensated, preventing social unrest and political instability. Reduced uncertainty during the transformational recession improved economic decisions by both the state and individuals, leading to sustained growth without macroeconomic imbalances. Hence, economic, social and political stability in Slovenia were gradualism's remarkable achievements (see Mencinger 2004) . Rojec et al. (2004, p. 461) identify various reasons for such choice: consensual decisionmaking; the early, endogenous transition; a high starting point of development; the dissolution of Yugoslavia and ensuing unstable politics, which cautioned against shock therapy. The first two are of particular interest for this article.
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After its independence, Slovenia developed into a consensual parliamentary democracy. The 1991 Constitution adopted an asymmetric bicameral legislature, where the 90-member National Assembly is vested with legislative power and the National Council has limited veto rights. The 40 members of the second chamber represent key economic interest organisations, an inheritance of the Yugoslav self-managed social partnership (Lukšič 2001, pp. 22-23) . Additionally, the Constitution prescribed a Proportional Representation (PR) electoral system with low thresholds that fragments the party system, promotes moderate pluralism and generates coalition governments (Toplak 2006 In 1991, the Democratic Opposition of Slovenia (Demos), representing a hybrid mixture of leftliberal and right-conservative elements, led the country to independence from war-ridden Yugoslavia.
After the quarrelsome coalition fell apart, in part due to internal disagreements on the issue of denationalisation (see Prunk, Toplak and Hočevar 2006, pp. 232-246) If the domination of the left-liberal bloc was politically (self-)limited, its cultural, economic and, less so, political elites displayed extremely high rates of reproduction. On the one hand, LDS granted some continuity with the Demos interlude by ruling through broad, ideologically heterogeneous coalitions, building alliances with, for example, the Slovenian People's Party (SLS) (Lukšič 2003, pp. 522-23) . Hence, the polarisation of the political space equalled zero until the 2004 elections, a feature 7 shared only by Turkmenistan -for slightly different reasons -in the post-socialist world (Frye 2010, p. 55) . On the other hand, the 'endogenous transition' allowed former elites to socialise into the new political system and maintain their pre-transition prominence (Adam and Tomšič 2002) . By virtue of its reformist status under Yugoslavia, the old elites managed to adapt to the new system seamlessly (Iglič and Rus 2000) , thereby -at least seemingly -not blocking the ongoing transformation (see Róna-Tas 1994) .
The result was that the business elites were from the left, while the parties of the Slovenian Spring considered themselves as the transition's losers. As the common goal of acceding to the EU compressed the political space, the potential conflict between the two blocs stayed practically muted for almost 15 years.
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Competitive neocorporatism
According to most observers, Slovenia evolved into a Coordinated Market Economy (Bohle and Greskovits 2012; Feldmann 2007; Guardiancich 2012b ) with some characteristics of managerial capitalism, such as insider ownership and a 'compensating state' (Stanojević 2012; Second, already under Yugoslavia, Slovenia relied on export-oriented firms, which, however, faced during self-management soft budget constraints (Kornai 1992) . As the Yugoslav Dinar was not convertible, and hard currency was needed, these firms were exporting even at a loss (and compensating at home, e.g. by letting workers engage in the informal economy). When the Yugoslav internal market disappeared, labour-intensive firms suffered, and as budget constraints hardened, export-oriented enterprises experienced a crisis of competitiveness. Concomitantly, high inflation hit the country, which Demos tried to fight through a wage freeze and the suspension of collective agreements. The unions, especially ZSSS, started a number of disruptive strikes.
When the LDS-led government took power in May 1992, it had to calm the strike wave and tame inflation. Two main concessions were legislated. The Ownership Transformation Act favoured various forms of insider privatization. The state and quasi-state institutions obtained the biggest stake in capitalintensive and export-oriented companies (Simoneti, Rojec and Gregorič 2004, p. 231) . Managers acquired a significant portion of the shares allocated to insiders. Instead, fulfilling a firm demand of ZSSS, employees became majority owners in (problematic) labour-intensive sectors (Stanojević 2012, p. 865) .
The strikes subsided immediately, and the labour movement gained reputation as a responsible bargainer.
As wage freezes could be no longer unilaterally legislated, in 1994, LDS engineered a political exchange between incomes policy (centralised wage bargaining that promoted wage moderation) and the institutionalisation of social dialogue through the tripartite Economic and Social Council (ESS).
The consolidation of 'competitive neocorporatism' (Stanojević 2014) in Slovenia had two beneficial effects. At the micro level, the Slovenian system of works councils evolved from Yugoslav self-management and was transformed in 1993, mimicking the German Betriebsräte (Buchen 2007) .
Strong (dual) workers' representation is warranted by firm-level labour union organisations, which operate in the majority of Slovenian firms. The German-inspired dual system of apprenticeship (in firms and vocational schools) and national qualification system provides technologically intensive sectors with the necessary knowhow (see Cedefop 2008) . At firm and sectoral levels, management and labour formed 'survival coalitions' based on non-conflictual micro-exchanges. In order to stay competitive, work 9 intensity and functional flexibility were compensated with high job security, limitations to dismissals, wage protection and generous pension benefits (Crowley and Stanojević 2011; Stanojević and Krašovec 2011; Stanojević 2012) .
At the macro level, institutionalised social pacts favoured competitiveness and economic stability, necessary requirements to comply with the Maastricht criteria. These agreements specify the obligations of the social partners, (partly) set the agenda for an incumbent government, and are the result of collective negotiations over economic, social and wage policy (Stanojević 2010) . through the upskilling of the labour force it became moderately competitive in technology intensive industries.
Technology intensive manufacturing
As mentioned above, Slovenia was an outlier already during socialist times: it was the most developed of the Yugoslav republics, it was geographically closest to Continental Western Europe and its economic elite, the 'red managers', administered firms, such as Krka and Lek pharmaceuticals, Gorenje home appliances, which dominated the Yugoslav internal market and were, to a certain extent, internationally competitive (Stanojević 2012 and Greskovits (2012, pp. 45-46) label Slovenia as being part of 'semicore' countries in international economic integration; that is, a country where skilled labour and autonomous management are abundant, but which has to rely on external sources (from advanced economies) for technology, capital and global entrepreneurship, and still lacks the skills and sophistication of its Western partners.
In sum, the gradualist approach to transformation backed up by consensual politics and functioning neocorporatism sustained and stabilized the growth of Slovenia's economy and especially of its technologically intensive firms, which became a role model for the rest of CEE.
The collapse explained
After more than a decade of real economic convergence to the EU, the Great Recession annulled most of the gains. Within the Eurozone, Slovenia had the worst economic performance in 2009-13, after
Greece. As shown in Table 1 
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The debt-to-GDP ratio more than tripled in five years ( prevented meaningful reforms to be legislated until it was too late. In 2011 the country slid into a bad equilibrium and still suffers from a severe debt overhang in the corporate sector and a huge reform backlog. The competitiveness of Slovenian enterprises, which was already declining as a consequence of the partial reform equilibrium, further deteriorated during the crisis, thereby holding up a healthy recovery.
The perils of protracted gradualism
Adam Przeworski (1991) has probably laid out the most persuasive argument in favour of gradualism. In his view, there is a trade-off between democratic processes and reform swiftness. As shock therapy imposes greater social costs onto the population, the losers of reform may halt the transitions from socialism to democracy, from central planning (or self-management) to a market economy, or both.
However, several authors voiced reservation over this argument. Hellman (1998) warns against shortterm winners that may capture the reform process; and even an ardent supporter of gradualism as Roland (2000, pp. 45-7) contends that correct sequencing is crucial. Reforms benefitting a minority of the (voting) population risk losing momentum vis-à-vis those producing benefits for the majority.
The experience of Slovenia corroborates these fears. Even though a gradual transition was initially beneficial, stretched in time it proved to be a double-edged sword. Rojec et al. (2004, p. 462) This partial reform equilibrium enabled the perpetuation of the lending and management practices, including a weak regulatory framework, inherited from socialism that underpinned the softness of the budget constraints of Slovenian enterprises. In practice, being part of a politically connected elite was a condition sine qua non to conduct business and to be awarded loans and subsidies without a proper risk assessment (see Damijan 2012b). Rojec et al. (2004, p. 477) enumerate the mechanisms through which gradualism maintained such status quo: a privatisation process, which did not generate an efficient ownership structure; state intervention in the economy through extensive state aid to the corporate sector;
hesitant liberalisation, demonopolisation and privatisation in the financial and non-tradable sectors; costly prevention of Slovenian Tolar appreciation. Such mix enabled an inefficient service sector to thrive at the expense of restructuring in tradables; crowded out companies from the capital market, favouring banks and the state; erected barriers to entry by subsidising existing companies; restricted FDIs; made imports more expensive. What is most important here is that incomplete privatisation of state-owned enterprises and banks gave rise to the unsustainable lending practices to the corporate sector that ultimately brought the Slovenian economy to its knees.
The ownership transformation of 'social property' inherited from Yugoslavia in Slovenia is a drama in three acts. The first act took place during the Demos political interlude in 1990-92. Simoneti, Rojec and Gregorič (2004, pp. 229-30) Analogously, private insurance companies were cost inefficient as they lacked foreign competition and modern financial instruments. During the 1990s, according to Mramor and Jašovič (2004, p. 277) , the
"opportunity for the capital market to play a central role in the Slovenian financial system [was] lost".
So, Slovenia became a universal banking system based on indirect financing, where banks comprise more than three-quarters of financial assets of all financial intermediaries (more than 20 percentage points higher than the EU average). With a stock market relegated to a marginal role, loans became the primary source of financing and displayed shorter maturities than other financial instruments (capital and debt securities).
In order to improve the transparency of the Slovenian financial system, Premier Janez Drnovšek's government decided in 2001-02 to privatise through an international tender the two major state-owned banks (NLB and NKBM). In the name of national interest the sale of the financial institutions was discredited (see Ribnikar 2002) and then blocked (NKBM remained 100 per cent stateowned, while just 34 per cent of NLB was sold to the Belgian bank KBC). v Hence, Slovenia remained the only former socialist country with the majority of the banking sector under domestic state ownership, which suffered from severe corporate governance problems as well as was subject to continuous political interference.
The third act leading to the collapse started when Janez Janša's right-conservative executive took power in 2004. Even though it promised a radical, neoliberal turn for the Slovenian economy, the government knew that the existing partial reform equilibrium would have advantaged the rightconservative elites as well. In order to beef up its ranks, Janša's launched the so-called 'cadre tsunami ', vi which replaced former leftist affiliates with own men in state-owned enterprises, funds, media and so on Quite the opposite happened. In order to empower right-conservative elites, the new government launched a second privatisation wave (Stanojević 2014, p. 107 and Pivovarna Laško, a brewing company (Mekina 2007) . The former was chaired by Igor Bavčar, a long-time friend and political collaborator of Janša, the latter by Boško Šrot, of the left-liberal camp. Šrot was given the possibility (and the credit) to acquire part of Mercator in exchange for influence on Delo, the largest Slovenian daily, which was at the time owned by Pivovarna Laško.
In conclusion, also during Janez Janša's rule, the partial reform equilibrium inherited from early transition has been maintained as it was instrumental both to co-opt the existing, entrenched elites that oligopolised the Slovenian economy during LDS's rule; and to empower the new ones, appointed by the right-conservative bloc.
Cheap credit and management buyouts
As explained in the previous paragraphs, the particularly inefficient privatisation process of the inherited Yugoslav 'social property' left the Slovenian economy with sizeable shares of state-owned enterprises and state-controlled financial institutions. Managers and bankers operated within a relatively stable partial reform equilibrium, which required a trigger to be fully exploited.
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With the approaching EU and prospective EMU membership and, hence, with greater access to cheap credit, Slovenian banks started granting loans to the corporate sector, which were used for ownership consolidation rather than for restructuring. vii The favoured takeover method was the management buy-out, mainly performed by internal managers (as in the case of Merkur, a homeimprovement business, and Bine Kordež), sometimes with the participation of external managers and employees (the cases of Iskra, electrical equipment, Autocommerce, a car retailer, or Viator & Vektor, transportation logistics).
Even though there are various ways to perform an MBO, possibly the simplest method is to first establish a shell company on behalf of the target firm's management. This then acquires a majority of the assets or equity of the target company and is in the end merged with it, so its debts get transferred to the target, which starts repaying them. What is more important for this paper is the way MBOs were financed.
The main instrument in Slovenia was the Lombard loan (Cekin.si 2009) . Managers were granted credit by banks against pledged companies in the form of securities that can be readily marketable beverages. In sum, Damijan (2012a) is probably right when stating that the responsibility for the Slovenian mess is easy to determine, but that there is no interest in doing so, as the main (political) actors would just "bump into themselves".
In sum, Slovenia was left with an over-leveraged corporate sector that was totally unprepared to face the global financial crisis. As international orders dried up, firms were unable to repay their debts.
While the banks started collecting the collateral, the Slovenian blue-chip index SBI TOP lost 66 per cent of its value in 2008 alone. Damijan (2014) calculates that by 2012, the total debt overhang (debt that has to be restructured) of the Slovenian corporate sector ranged between 27 and 36 per cent of GDP.
Widespread bankruptcies left Slovenian banks with some 22 per cent of GDP worth of bad loans.
Eurozone dynamics created the, now familiar, banking-sovereign spiral that pushed countries such as Table 3 shows that constructions as well as sectors, where major MBOs took place (trade, transport, financial intermediation and professional activities) are most exposed to NPLs. Large domestic banks (SOBs) not only hold the largest share of NPLs, but also have 54 per cent of claims unsecured and the rest covered by poor collateral, such as real estate that underwent various devaluations (Bank of Slovenia 2014, p. 37) . By contrast, the problem for banks under majority foreign ownership is less acute.
viii Notwithstanding, there are two reasons why the construction's sector crisis has to be assimilated to the rest of the narrative, being directly related to the partial reform equilibrium delineated above. First, the business model of construction companies gradually evolved towards investment in real estate development, which was in a time of growing housing prices more profitable than construction only.
These companies started buying real estate that could generate prospective revenues (e.g. the shipyards in Izola, the housing complex Celovški dvori in Ljubljana, the tobacco company Tobačna Ljubljana etc.). In order to make these acquisitions, SOBs granted them loans backed by real estate collateral, whose value rapidly increased until 2008. The Great Recession sent house prices crashing down by some 29 per cent in inflation-adjusted terms until the end of 2013 (Matić 2012; European Commission 2014, pp. 16-17) .
Second, and most importantly, the largest construction companies in Slovenia (SCT Ljubljana, Vegrad 
Political polarisation and the exhaustion of neocorporatism
Beyond the banking and sovereign-debt crises, the main factor aggravating Slovenia's decline is the policymakers' delay in responding to the emergency. Political polarisation and the exacerbation of the conflict among social partners are both to blame for prolonged policy paralysis. Reforms have proven impossible to achieve at a time they were most needed. In particular, the necessary banking restructuring and fiscal consolidation were both delayed by at least four years.
On the political front, the ascendance of the right-conservative bloc to power in 2004 sounded the knell for Slovenian bi-partisan, consensual decision-making. Guardiancich (2012b) On the corporatist front, Stanojević (2012; explains why social dialogue weakened (perhaps irreversibly) during the accession process to the EMU. The system of 'competitive solidarity'
was based on the unsustainable use of the inherited human capital. First, the labour market became dualised, pitching older core workers (highly protected) against new labour market entrants, thereby creating a generational divide. Schools and universities compensated for the lack of numerical flexibility in Slovenian enterprises by creating extremely flexible, unprotected 'student jobs'. Pahor's Minister for Development Mitja Gaspari noted in 2010 that (Gaspari 2010) : "The greatest informal economy in Slovenia is lawful, and this is student jobs."
Second, in order to accommodate the external pressures of EMU accession, especially after the exchange rate was fixed in July 2006, the workforce was put under unprecedented strain and the traditional means for compensation were deemed insufficient (Stanojević 2014, p. 107) . The workers demanded wage increases, became increasingly dissatisfied with union representatives and resorted to wildcat strikes even in successful companies, such as Gorenje (Stanojević 2009 ).
The unravelling of 'survival communities' coincided with a dramatic weakening of the social partners. Union density collapsed from 40. wrecked against the mass demonstrations of the unions (November 2005) , which were excluded from decision-making for the first time in more than a decade. The government's popularity plunged and never recovered, despite its procyclical spending on expensive projects (such as the highway network) and an overall increase in public sector wages.
The following, centre-left government headed by Borut Pahor's Social Democrats was left with almost no room for manoeuvre when the Great Recession hit Slovenia. As international orders declined, bankruptcies and unemployment mounted. According to Stanojević (2014, p. 108 ) the major loser were the younger generations, as temporary forms of employment were hit hardest. By 2009, the country was shaken by wildcat strikes. Pahor's government responded with a number of short-term anti-crisis measures (reduced working time and temporary layoffs), which were still successfully concerted with the unions and employers. Faced with growing labour unrest, it recognised that the minimum wage was set too low. A wage hike became an unconditional request of ZSSS, and was accepted by the employers in exchange for the flexibilisation of employment contracts. The plan did not work out: Pahor gave in to the unions, but did not manage to construct the packaged deal demanded by GZS (Guardiancich 2012a ).
The situation swiftly deteriorated. On the one hand, the employers started to boycott the ESS, facilitate the privatisation of non-core assets. On the negative side, there were notable delays and unpopular measures such as an increase in VAT. More efforts are needed to further rebalance the pension system, redraft the fiscal framework, regulate professions and student jobs, accelerate the privatisation of core SOEs, and revise minimum wages to regain the lost cost competitiveness. Banks still retain too many NPLs and corporate debt restructuring is at an early stage, so full recovery is yet to be achieved (Damijan 2014; European Commission 2014, p. 24) .
Summing up, the number of failed reform attempts (the most spectacular being Pahor's) testifies to how the interaction between a divided political class and entrenched social partners is detrimental to finding rapid solutions within a polity accustomed to consensual and gradual institutional change. These failures to restructure were not reasons for the country's sudden collapse; however, they played a crucial role in exacerbating the effects of the Great Recession.
Deteriorating competitiveness and the debt overhang
Despite the effectiveness of 'competitive neocorporatism', which had generated sustained growth, Slovenian firms operated in a partial reform equilibrium, where poor corporate governance and ineffective regulation were the norm. Rojec et al. (2004, p. 464) documented the deterioration in Slovenian manufacturing exports to the EU vis-à-vis other CEE countries already in 2004. In particular, the composition of exports showed a languishing share of non-inferior intra-industry trade (that is, highvalue-added high-tech manufacturing), thereby drawing attention to the long-term weaknesses of the Slovenian economy that were lowering the country's overall competitiveness. The authors impute the sluggish pace of economic restructuring to the, now familiar, failures of protracted gradualism: slow privatisation, excessive state intervention (subsidies and micromanagement), insufficient liberalisation, inefficient regulation of monopolies as well as the preservation of distortionary price-regulating methods.
This claim sits uneasily with most enthusiastic assessments of the Slovenian production regime.
As illustration, despite a relatively high share of medium-high and high-tech production in manufacturing, the value added per employee in high-tech has fluctuated between 55.6 and 60. Excessive indebtedness and lower cost competitiveness precipitated Slovenian firms from a partial reform equilibrium that was artificially propped by the global boom, into a bad equilibrium, from which they can escape only through governmental intervention.
According to Damijan (2014) , up to 13 out of 23 thousand Slovenian companies face an unsustainable debt burden. Six industries (manufacturing, construction, wholesale and retail trade, transportation and storage, real estate, professional, scientific and technical activities) hold most of the excessive debt, which is highly concentrated: the 300 top debtor companies account for 70 per cent of the total debt overhang. The share of non-viable companies that should face bankruptcy is huge: 13.7 per cent or 3,175 firms, which represent 13.0 per cent of Slovenian value added, 14.4 per cent of employment and 7.1 per cent of exports. Of these, nine are too big to fail -five state-owned companies in public utilities (highways, rail, electricity) and four companies that were subject to buyouts, that is, Mercator and Merkur (wholesale and retail trade), Pivovarna Laško (food industry), and Cimos (automotive industry) -which again shows the softness of budget constraints in Slovenia and the damage inflicted through leveraged MBOs. Moreover, lack of firm financial soundness became a critical factor constraining firm performance during the crisis (Damijan 2014) . High leverage and the ability to service the outstanding debt inhibit productivity growth and reduce exports, employment and investment. Small and medium enterprises fare here worse as they have a weaker position when renegotiating their debts.
Deterioration in Slovenian cost competitiveness went hand-in-hand with lower productivity.
Compensation per employee increased substantially in 2008, following wage adjustment for high past inflation and productivity in the private sector, and due to the Virant reform, called after Janša's Minister of Public Administration Gregor Virant, that equalised wages (upwards) in the public sector (IMAD 2011, p. 90) . Additionally, in 2010, the Pahor government introduced a major, 23 per cent hike in minimum wages, which was only partly offset by a freeze in indexation elsewhere. Increasing unit labour costs grew out of line with labour productivity and the real effective exchange rate (REER) has deteriorated vis-à-vis the Eurozone, mainly due to the short-term anti-crisis measures, which encouraged wage inertia and labour hoarding (European Commission 2014, pp. 29-30) .
In order to hasten the recovery, the twin problems of indebtedness and cost competitiveness require a comprehensive governmental plan. The exit of non-viable firms should be facilitated through smoother bankruptcy and insolvency procedures, viable firms need thorough debt restructuring and labour costs have to be brought in line with productivity through lower labour taxation, diversified minimum wages and reformed public salaries. The reduction of the state's share in all branches of the economy is a final conditio sine qua non (see Georgieva and Riquelme 2013) .
Conclusions
This article individuated the main reason behind Slovenia's decline from post-socialist frontrunner to sick man of Europe: a protracted gradualist approach that never rectified an inefficient privatisation process, Slovenia's original sin. This locked the country into a partial reform equilibrium, where economic elites -the short-term winners -were extracting rents. The flood of cheap credit, following the accession to the EU, as well as the gridlock in policymaking pushed the country into an economic and political bad equilibrium, whose consequences are felt almost seven years into the Great Recession. Despite a relative ease of the financial markets' grip over the tiny ex-Yugoslav republic, the economic and political challenges ahead are as formidable as ever.
If debt restructuring and recovery in competitiveness are foremost to bring the economy back into shape, it is the political system that failed in its tasks for almost a decade. Even though an international bailout has been for now avoided, the country is de facto applying an externally dictated rescue-cum-retrenchment package, which often undermined the input and output legitimacy of the governments that received them (Scharpf 2011) . Notwithstanding, the successful and autonomous disentanglement from the crisis is crucial to regain public confidence and trust in national institutions, which is, according to Niko Toš of Politbarometer, at its lowest in Slovenian history.
Commenting on the perils of protracted gradualism, back in 2004, Rojec et al. (2004: 62) its tracks, will bring more social and economic pain than an even slightly more timely intervention.
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